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A
t a recent conference in Rio de Janeiro, the keynote speaker reflected back on
 economist A.B. Atkinson’s 1997 Presidential Address to Britain’s Royal Economic Society,
titled “Bringing Income Distribution in from the Cold.” According to the speaker, income
distribution — and in particular inequality — was not merely back in from the cold but had
actually become a very “hot” issue in development discourse after years of relative neglect.
This is certainly evident in Latin America — and perhaps nowhere more so than in
Brazil, where the new UNDP International Poverty Centre (IPC) is located. Only
last October three major Brazilian publications made inequality their key concern.
The first was a compendium of socio-economic indicators spanning the twentieth
century, published by IBGE, the national statistical office. It portrayed a country that,
from 1900 to 2000, had grown immensely richer yet distinctly more unequal. At about
the same time, UNDP launched the Atlas of Human Development in Brazil. The Atlas
confirmed that income distribution worsened during the 1990s in two-thirds of Brazil’s
5,500 municipalities, despite major improvements in other quality-of-life indicators.
Right on the heels of these two studies, a prestigious local think tank, FGV, presented
the Hunger Map. It showed that 50 million Brazilians — about a third of the population
— live in miserable conditions today, with a daily food intake of less than 2,280 calories
and an income below US$1 a day.
Unfortunately, dramatic social disparities are neither limited to income nor unique to
Brazil. A new study by the World Bank has found that income inequality rose in a good
number of Latin American countries over the last decade, at times quite significantly.
This may help explain the high level of disaffection among the region’s citizens with
the quality of democracy on the continent. Beyond Latin America, the UNDP Human
Development Report 2003 reveals the existence of sizable human development gaps in all
regions. Huge, even widening, disparities between rich and poor may continue to exist
behind a façade of overall social progress. The persistence of such inequities could
thwart progress towards the Millennium Development Goals. And even if a country
does accomplish one or more goals, such achievement would be diminished if it does
not lead to tangible improvements in the lives of its most disadvantaged citizens.
The revival of interest in inequality stems partly from the increased availability since
the 1990s of household-level data sets for a growing number of countries. As survey
data became available, analysts were given the means to test their hypothesis, and
validate (or refute) long-held assumptions such as about tradeoffs between equity and
efficiency or between redistribution and growth. Greater access to country surveys also
has made it possible to track changes in inequality within and across countries, as well
as explore its structural and micro-level determinants. Empirical research thus has
confirmed the existence of worsening distributional trends over the past two decades
within a cross-section of developing countries and transition economies. It also has
revealed a trend towards growing inequality between nations, with some countries
seemingly caught in a “poverty trap” of low growth rates and chronic poverty.
These findings, combined with a renewed concern for poverty and the determinants
of growth since the 1990s, have led to a surge of interest in the relationship between
growth, poverty and distribution. Does inequality hamper efforts to reduce poverty?
How do high initial levels of poverty and inequality affect subsequent growth rates?
Under what conditions is growth pro-poor? And what policy and program interventions
might lead to sustainable declines in poverty and more equitable social outcomes?
This first issue of In Focus takes up some of these questions. In future issues, we will
continue to present the results of current research on poverty by internationally
renowned authors. Thus, we hope to place ourselves at the heart of policy debates
on poverty, equity, and human development, reaching as wide an audience of
policymakers and practitioners as possible.
In Focus is an online bulletin of the UNDP
International Poverty Centre (IPC). Its purpose
is to present succinctly the results of recent
research on poverty and inequality in the
developing world.
Based in Brazil, IPC joins the Oslo Governance
Centre (Norway) and the Drylands Development
Centre (Kenya) as the newest global thematic
facility of UNDP. IPC is designed to facilitate,
promote, and disseminate knowledge and
experiences that may lead to tangible
improvements in the lives of poor people in
developing countries. A basic goal of IPC is to
improve global understanding about the causes
of poverty and inequality – a first step for
devising policies and programs to tackle them.
IPC´s activities are aligned with UNDP´s key
objective of supporting the Millennium
Development Goals, as unanimously adopted
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Brazil experienced major progress
in human development during the 1990s.
Between 1991 and 2000, the country’s HDI
increased seven percentage points (from
0.70 to 0.77), which placed the country in
65th position in the global HDI ranking.
Such gains were broad-based and
inclusive. It spread to almost every
corner of the country and was more
pronounced in those areas that had
been lagging in human development.
Remarkably, only five of Brazil’s 5,507
municipalities did not see their HDI values
improve during the decade. Progress was
not merely broad-based, but also of
considerable magnitude. HDI values rose
by more than one percentage point per
year in nearly half of Brazilian
municipalities while one out of every 25
municipalities witnessed annual increases
of less than 0.5 percentage points.
Municipalities with the lowest HDI values
at the beginning of the 1990s were the
ones that progressed the most, which
reflects the inclusive nature of Brazil’s
record during the decade. HDI values
rose by 10 or more percentage points
among the municipalities with an HDI
lower than 0.50, as opposed to less than
five percentage points among those with
HDIs above 0.75. The resulting decrease
in spatial inequalities across Brazil has
led to a substantial decline in the mean
distance among the HDI values of the
country’s 5,507 municipalities between
1991 and 2000.
Small and medium-sized districts have
seen the sharpest improvements in
human development during the decade.
Their HDI values rose nine percentage
points, as compared to only six
percentage points for municipalities with
over 25,000 inhabitants. Nevertheless,
large disparities still persist across Brazil
despite the balanced and all-
encompassing progress of the last
decade. To cite but one example, the HDI
of São Clemente do Sul, a well-off
municipality in the prosperous
southeastern state of São Paulo, is on
par with that of Spain (ranked 19th in
the global HDI table), whereas the HDI of
Manari, in the impoverished northeastern
state of Pernambuco, is identical to that
of Haiti (150th in the HDI ranking).
Furthermore, Brazil’s human progress
during the 1990s has not been balanced
across all three dimensions that comprise
the HDI. One dimension alone — access to
knowledge — was responsible for about
half the progress achieved. While this
component of the HDI rose 10
percentage points throughout the
decade (from 0.75 to 0.85), the income
and life expectancy components rose
four and six percentage points,
respectively. Major advances in
education, therefore, largely account for
the positive results attained over the last
10 years.
Expanding access to knowledge
actually has been the main force driving
the significant reduction in spatial
inequalities mentioned above. Almost
two-thirds of the progress registered
in municipalities with low HDIs is
explained by that factor alone. Likewise,
improvements in access to knowledge
have been twice as pronounced in small
and medium-sized municipalities as
in larger ones. By itself, this component
is responsible for almost 90% of the
decline in spatial disparities in HDI
values that took place during the 1990s.
In contrast, gaps in the other two
components of the HDI (life expectancy
and income) changed very little
throughout the decade.
In contrast to the remarkable educational
progress experienced by Brazil during




In October 2003, UNDP, IPEA,
and the João Pinheiro
Foundation (FJP) launched
the Human Development
Atlas of Brazil, an automated
database intended to demo-
cratize access to relevant
socio-economic data for the
country’s 5,507 municipalities
and 27 states.
Based on micro-data from the
national censuses of 1991
and 2000, the Atlas provides
information on the Human
Development Index (HDI) and
124 other geo-referenced





The depth of information
contained in the Atlas makes
it possible to examine broad
development trends in the
country, as well as possible
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the 1990s, trends in income inequality
have been much less positive and
decidedly more complex. Aggregate
inequality remained relatively stable,
with only a slight increase of the Gini
coefficient from 0.63 to 0.65. Nevertheless,
such apparent stability merely obscures
significant changes in its components.
Using the Theil index of inequality, it is
possible to observe a widening gap in
intra-municipal disparities alongside a
decrease in inequality between
municipalities from the same state, as well
as among states in each of Brazil’s regions
and between the regions themselves.
Growing intra-municipal inequality
actually offset the reduction in disparities
between municipalities, states, and
regions across Brazil. Notably, three-
fourths of Brazil’s inequality today is
explained by the existence of huge
income gaps within municipalities (i.e.
between households residing in the same
district) suggesting that income inequality
in Brazil is essentially locally rooted.
Improvements in human development
do not depend only on the availability
of resources, but also on the
effectiveness with which such resources
are channeled towards tangible quality-
of-life advances. Communities with
greater access to knowledge or lower
poverty levels normally exhibit better
results in terms of life expectancy or
infant mortality. However, there are also
communities with below-average access
to knowledge that nonetheless manage
to achieve infant mortality or poverty
rates as low as those of more privileged
areas. It is the presence of such efficiency
gains that accounts for the great
divergence in the capacity of different
states and municipalities to transform
available resources into positive
outcomes. The sharing of experiences
could, therefore, help tremendously to
improve the effectiveness of resource use
for human development purposes.
Brazil’s experience during the 1990s
presents important lessons for other
countries. The remarkable achievements
of the last decade owe a great deal to
the fact that access to knowledge has
expanded so vigorously. Such a
development contrasts sharply with
the country’s past tradition, in which
“progress” had always been equated
with economic growth. Over the last
10 years, Brazil has demonstrated that
it is possible to make major strides
along the path of human development
even in the absence of substantial
economic expansion.
Moreover, this new “style” of
development based on greatly improved
access to knowledge has brought a
significant reduction in the country’s
entrenched disparities between states
and municipalities. Again, such an
outcome is in sharp contrast with the
experience of past decades, during which
development in Brazil typically was
accompanied by rising inequality.
A corollary from this experience is that
substantial economic growth is neither
a necessary nor a sufficient condition for
a country to attain inclusive, broad-based
human development with increased
equity. The question remains whether
this new “style” of development is
sustainable and desirable — or merely
all that realistically may be accomplished
when external constraints undermine
the prospects for achieving solid
economic growth.
UNDP, IPEA and FJP, Atlas do
Desenvolvimento Humano no Brasil, 2003.
Global targets, local strategies
Municipalities that are geographically close to one another and have similar
HDI values may still face sharply different challenges along the path to human
development. For instance, three districts from the impoverished state of Maranhão
present identical HDI (0.50), which places them in the group of 20 municipalities with
the lowest HDI in Brazil. Despite this similarity, the bottlenecks each one of these
three districts must confront differ completely from one case to another.
Income generation is the main constraint for the district of Belágua. With a per capita
income of only 10% of the national mean, Belágua ranks better than only two of
Brazil’s 5,507 municipalities for this indicator. Nonetheless, Belágua’s ranking vis-à-vis
other districts is much better with respect to life expectancy and literacy rates. Thus,
while Belágua’s HDI is among the lowest in the country, its main problem obviously
derives from lack of income rather than from any other dimension contained in the
index.
The case of Araióses is different. Life expectancy there is 13 years lower than the
national average, and only higher than in two of Brazil’s municipalities. Yet, its per
capita income and literacy rates surpass those of numerous municipalities. It appears
that for Araióses, the main impediment for human development relates to a greater
extent to poor health conditions than to gaps in income generation or access
to knowledge.
The third district, Fernando Falcão, has an exceedingly high illiteracy rate (over 55%),
the 10th worst among Brazil’s municipalities. By contrast, more than 100 districts have
a lower per capita income than Fernando Falcão, and almost 250 others have worse
rates of life expectancy. Evidently, the key bottleneck for this community is its limited
access to knowledge.
The contrasts between these three cases reveal that while human development is an
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According to the “trickle down”
theory, the benefits of economic growth
are spread automatically across all
segments of society. They go to the rich
first and then the poor begin to benefit
once the wealthy start spending their
income. As a result, the most effective
way of reducing poverty is by promoting
rapid economic growth since the poor
stand to gain from it through a vertical
flow of resources from the rich.
This was the dominant view among
development economists back in the
1950s and 1960s. Given their emphasis on
promoting rapid growth, most policy
debates during that period revolved
around increasing savings and
investments. By the early 1970s, the
trickle-down theory had lost some of its
shine, although it never fully faded away
from the development discourse.
During the 1990s, the theory gained a
new lease on life amid an intense debate
on the relationship between growth,
inequality, and poverty. The World Bank’s
improved database on income
distribution triggered a large crop of
cross-country analyses that suggested
growth and poverty reduction were
strongly and positively correlated. Such
views received a further boost from the
publication of a highly influential World
Bank study by David Dollar and Aart
Kraay in 2000. Using cross-country
regressions for a sample of 80 countries
over four decades, they concluded that
economic growth benefited the poor to
the same extent that it did the whole
economy. An important implication from
this study was that “growth is good for
the poor,” irrespective of its nature.
Governments needed not to follow
explicit pro-poor polices and instead
could focus on maximizing growth while
maintaining macroeconomic stability to
shrink the ranks of their poor.
However, some of these conclusions have
been highly controversial and empirically
questioned. The Dollar and Kraay study is
based on cross-country regressions that
can only depict average trends but fail to
capture individual country experiences.
Obviously, one cannot have the same
policy prescriptions for all countries.
Growth-maximizing policies may be
adequate for some but not for others,
which may require explicit pro-poor
policies aimed at reducing inequality.
Undoubtedly, economic growth has an
important bearing on poverty rates.
Growth generates additional goods and
services in the economy, which then can be
distributed among the population. If all
individuals receive the benefits from
growth in the same proportion, then
poverty rates should fall quickly. But this
does not always happen. In times of growth,
some people inevitably receive more than
their proportional share, changing levels
of inequality in a society and impacting
the pace of poverty reduction.
Changes in a country’s poverty rate
actually are conditioned by two factors.
First is the rate of economic growth; the
larger it is, the greater the extent of
poverty reduction. The second is the
degree to which the benefits of growth
accrue to the poor. These two factors can
move in opposite directions, meaning
that the magnitude of poverty reduction
is not always a monotonically increasing
function of the growth rate. If growth is
accompanied by rising inequality, then a
positive growth rate can even lead to
increased poverty. To quicken the pace of
poverty reduction, there may have to be
a mixture of policies that enhances
growth and at the same time improves
income or consumption distribution.
We have developed an indicator called
the Poverty Equivalent Growth Rate
by Nanak Kakwani,
University of South Wales,
Australia
At similar rates of economic
growth, countries may exhibit
widely dissimilar track
records in reducing poverty.
An index that combines the
effects of growth and
distributional changes helps




Pro-poor growth requires a
strategy that is deliberately
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(PEGR), which combines both these
factors — growth rate and distribution
— into one index. A country’s PEGR can
easily be computed if there are
household income and expenditure
surveys for at least two periods. When
the PEGR is larger, the greater will be the
proportional reduction in poverty for a
given growth in mean income. Thus, one
can always tell which of two or more
growth strategies delivers more to the
poor by simply looking at the value of
the index.
In calculating the PEGR, one can obtain
four alternative scenarios. The first,
“trickle-down growth,” occurs when the
PEGR lies between zero and the growth
rate of mean income or consumption.
Under this scenario, increases in
national output reduce poverty but are
accompanied by worsening inequality.
The pace of poverty reduction is not
sufficiently fast, as the poor benefit
from growth proportionally less than
the non-poor.
The second scenario is when a positive
growth rate actually increases poverty.
This occurs when inequality rises to the
extent that it offsets the beneficial
impact of growth. This situation may be
characterized as “immiserizing” growth.
By contrast, a scenario of “pro-poor
growth” presupposes a strategy that is
deliberately biased in favor of the poor,
leading to a rapid decrease in the
incidence of poverty. This may occur in
relative or absolute terms. Relative
inequality improves when economic
growth benefits the poor proportionally
more than the non-poor. Meanwhile,
absolute inequality falls when the poor
receive at least the same amount of
benefits than the non-poor. This is, in
fact, the strongest requirement for
achieving pro-poor growth and can thus
be characterized as “super pro-poor
growth.”
A country’s initial level of economic
development and income inequality
matter for which of these four scenarios
occurs during periods of economic
growth. Our analytical findings show that
low initial inequality results in faster
poverty reduction given a certain rate of
economic growth.
Applying the PEGR methodology to
Korea and Thailand suggests that Korea’s
growth during the 1990s was
significantly more pro-poor than in
Thailand. However, in both cases the
poor suffered disproportionately from
the fallout following Asia’s economic
crisis during 1997-98. Unlike Thailand,
Korea had some welfare programs in
place prior to the crisis. After the currency
collapsed, the Korean government
moved quickly to expand existing
programs, providing timely help to the
people most affected and fostering the
country’s rapid recovery.
By contrast, Thailand had no safety net
programs in place when turbulence hit.
Despite receiving fresh money from
donor agencies for emergency
programming, the Thai government
could not swiftly implement any effective
policies to assist vulnerable groups and
instead relied on ad hoc policies that
helped little during the crisis. A clear
implication from these two experiences
has been the realization that there is a
need for comprehensive social security
schemes that provide adequate safety
nets on a permanent basis for society’s
neediest people.
The application of our methodology to
other Asian countries reveals a similar
divergence in the poverty-reducing
impact from alternative growth
strategies. In Vietnam, poverty declined
sharply between 1992-93 and 1997-98,
particularly in rural areas, reflecting the
government’s adoption of a mix of
growth-enhancing and pro-poor policies.
India’s performance sharply diverges
from that of Vietnam. Between the 1950s
and 1970s, India progressed little in
cutting poverty rates. During the 1980s,
however, the country saw a sharp decline
in poverty — a probable by-product
from the numerous policies introduced
beginning in the mid-1970s to assist the
poor, particularly in rural areas. The PEGR
methodology shows that India’s growth
turned pro-poor in the 1980s, when
disadvantaged rural households began
receiving larger proportional benefits
from the country’s growth. However,
similar gains were not attained for the
urban poor. Almost 32% of the growth
achieved during that period was lost in
the cities because the poor were
receiving proportionally fewer benefits
from economic expansion than the rich.
There was increased inequality even
among those living below the poverty
line such that the “ultra poor” enjoyed
smaller proportional gains from growth
than other poor groups.
Finally, the case of China demonstrates
that achieving rapid economic growth
does not necessarily lead to equally rapid
declines in poverty. Widely regarded as a
star in achieving spectacular output gains
along with impressive poverty reduction,
China’s record looks less stunning upon
further scrutiny. The country’s annual
growth rate of 9.5% during the 1990s
outpaced proportional declines in
poverty. Moreover, poverty incidence
actually rose during China’s slowdown
from 1996 to 1999 despite a still positive
but less robust rate of economic growth.
In light of these findings, the PEGR would
suggest that growth in China generally
has not been pro-poor.
An important message from these five
cases is that faster growth actually may
lead to a slower reduction or even a rise
in poverty depending on how it affects
inequality. Even tame economic growth
will reduce poverty faster if inequality
falls during its course. This result
suggests that modest yet pro-poor
growth can have a greater and more
positive impact on poverty rates than
higher but pro-rich growth.
Which outcome is preferable — rapid
growth with rising inequality or slower
growth with falling inequality? This
obviously is an empirical question that
the PEGR can help policymakers answer.
Nanak Kakwani, Shahidur Khandker and
Hyun H. Son, Poverty Equivalent Growth
Rate, with Applications to Korea and
Thailand, 2003.
A country’s performance
should be judged on the
basis of poverty
equivalent growth and
not by growth rates alone. UNDP  International Poverty Centre   In Focus   January  2004    7
For many of the world’s poor, public
safety net programs may be the only
hope for a life free from chronic poverty.
Unfortunately, many transfer programs
in practice confront serious
shortcomings. They rarely reach the most
vulnerable groups and are not highly
cost effective due to unnecessarily large
administrative costs. Their primary focus
on alleviating current poverty also fails to
generate sustainable declines in poverty
levels. In very poor countries, large-scale
safety nets may not even be viable
because of the high cost of covering a
large fraction of the population.
To address these failings, a number of
countries have recently experimented
with a new type of social safety net —
the conditioned transfer for education
(CTE). A CTE gives poor families a
monthly payment for keeping their
children in school. A basic premise
of CTE programs is that households in
extreme poverty are poor not only in
terms of income or consumption, but
also capabilities like health and
education. Parents from poor families
often cannot afford to send their
children to school because of the
economic and opportunity costs
involved. The low educational
achievement of poor children then
impacts their lifetime productivity and
earnings, ensuring the transmission and
persistence of poverty both within and
across generations. To break this vicious
cycle, CTE programs seek to combine
social assistance with social development
by linking transfers to poor families to
investments in the education and health
status of their members.
Given these concerns, two design
features of CTE programs are particularly
important to mention. First, the programs
use a range of targeting methods to
ensure that benefits (typically cash
transfers but also sometimes transfers in
kind) reach the poorest households.
Second, a household’s continued
eligibility to receive benefits is tied to its
children attending school and, in many
cases, health centers. Failure to meet
these conditions leads to temporary, and
eventually permanent, loss of benefits. In
this sense, cash-for-education programs
seek to alleviate current poverty while at
the same time increasing a household’s
ability to escape chronic poverty by
encouraging investment in the education
and health of its children.
One of the key advantages of CTE
programs lies in this dual nature. They
combine the traditional, preventative role
of a transfer program with the
promotional or developmental role of
public investments in human capabilities.
The cash transfer component helps to
raise temporarily the income of poor
families like any other safety net
program. But unlike pure transfer
programs, CTE schemes produce long-
term gains by permanently increasing
the educational attainment of the
household’s children. Once educated,
poor children are less likely to slip back
into poverty. Their future earnings
potential, augmented by the additional
years of education they have received,
helps prevent the transmission of
poverty to the next generation. One may
think of CTE programs as an anti-poverty
transfer with a side education benefit or
as education schemes with a positive
poverty-reduction externality. Either
way, they offer a new and promising
tool for policymakers.
In a recent book with David Coady, we
examined the basic features and impact
of CTE programs in six countries:
Bangladesh, Brazil, Chile, Honduras,
Mexico, and Nicaragua. By any measure,








Because one of the most
important assets of the poor
is their own labor, linking
monetary transfers to
investments in health and
education holds the promise
of breaking the transmission
of poverty to future
generations.
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budgets and coverage. They account
for 0.1% to 0.2% of GDP, and from about
1% to over 5% of government current
expenditures. As a share of public
spending on education, they range
from 2.5% in Brazil to nearly 10% in
Nicaragua, and typically account for a
large share of resources spent at the
primary educational level in all
six countries.
The payments made by these programs
average between 4% and 20% of the
beneficiary households’ total income.
Benefits are conditioned on participating
children maintaining a school attendance
record of 85% or better, which is normally
monitored at the school level. Apart from
the education subsidy, CTE programs in
Honduras (PRAF), Nicaragua (RPS), and
Mexico (PROGRESA) provide an additional
cash transfer that is conditional on family
members visiting preventative health
centers for regular check-ups, growth
monitoring, nutrition counseling, and
vaccinations. Some of the programs
supplement these demand-side subsidies
with direct transfers to schools and
health posts to cover staff salaries and
other input costs to ensure the quality
and adequacy of services provided.
What we found in our review of CTE
programs is encouraging. All of them
seem to have made a positive
contribution to increased schooling
among children from poor households.
Conditional transfers in Mexico are
clearly associated with earlier ages
of school entry, lower dropout rates,
better grade progression, and higher
school reentry rates among dropouts.
We estimate that the accumulated effect
of PROGRESA transfers will result in a
10% rise in the educational attainment
of the poor by the end of the ninth
grade, up from an average of 6.2 years
of completed schooling. Most of the
educational impact has occurred among
students in their final year of junior
high school, including a 20% increase
in enrollment for girls.
Enrollment and grade progression also
have improved in Nicaragua, where RPS
subsidies are expected to raise the
average education level for children from
participating communities by nearly 25%
by the end of the ninth grade. Likewise,
there was a big jump in enrollments
following the introduction of FFE in
Bangladesh. The program has been
associated with a 9% increase in the
probability of a child being enrolled in
school. Impacts on health, nutrition, and
the incidence of child labor also have
been considerable although too many
children still continue to combine work
and school.
CTE programs seem to have equally
positive impacts on poverty, largely as
a result of the improved targeting of
benefits. The Chilean program, SUF,
delivers 90% of its benefits to the bottom
40% of the population. In Nicaragua,
combined education and health
subsidies are large enough to reduce the
moderate poverty gap by up to 70% in
Country Program Program type Program size * Coverage Transfer level** Program impacts
Bangladesh FFE Food transfers 4.2% of TPS and 2.1 million children $36 per student Positive impact on school  enrollment,
(1993) conditioned on school 7.9% of GSE (1999) and about 25% of per year attendance and  dropout rates, but not on
attendance by children poor households student-teacher ratios and test scores.
from poor households Limited impact on poverty due to small
transfer size and narrow coverage
of the poor
Brazil Bolsa Escola Cash transfer to poor 0.7% of TPS and 5 million families Up to $18 per Positive education outcomes (right-age
(2001) households with children 2.5% of GSE (2001) and 8.6 million family per month, school entry, dropout and promotion rates)
attending school students (2002) or $216 per year and possibly on poverty depth
Chile SUF Cash subsidy conditional 0.9% of TPS and Almost 1 million About $6 per child Strong redistributive impact, reducing the
(1998) on school attendance and 3.5% of GSE (1998) students (1998) per month income ratio of top to bottom quintile from
regular health check-ups 15.5 to 8.5 times
Honduras PRAF*** Conditional cash transfers 2% of TPS and 5% 48,000 households in Education voucher Not available
(2000) for primary school-age of GSE (2001) 50 municipalities worth $58 per child,
children attending school, and health voucher
pregnant women, and worth $46 per family
mothers of children aged per year
0-3 for regular health visits
Nicaragua RPS*** Cash transfers conditioned 2.2% of TPS and over 10,000 households Up to $335 per family Positive impacts on poverty, incidence of
(2000) on attendance to schools 10% of GSE (2001) (2001) per year child work, school enrollment and grade
and scheduled health visits progression
 and information lectures
Mexico PROGRESA Cash transfers conditioned 1.6% of TPS, 4.1% 2.6 million families, Average monthly Positive impacts on schooling, health, and
(1997) on school attendance, of GSE, and 20% of or 40% of all rural transfer of $25 per nutrition, as well as on rural poverty and labor
 integrated with a health federal poverty families (1999) household, up to a force participation for boys
and nutrition component reduction budget maximum of $79
(1999) in 1999
* As share of total public spending (TPS) and of total government spending on education (GSE).  ** All figures are in US dollars (US$).  *** Pilot phase. UNDP  International Poverty Centre   In Focus   January  2004    9
participating RPS communities. Of total
program beneficiaries, 80% are poor,
including 42% living in extreme poverty.
No formal data exists for Brazil’s Bolsa
Escola program, but some studies
estimate that CTE payments have raised
the income of beneficiary households
by 20% to 30%. And in Mexico, PROGRESA
has been credited with reducing the
poverty headcount and poverty gap
by 17% and 36%, respectively, in studies
comparing participating and control
communities before and after the
introduction of the program. Based on
our own calculations, PROGRESA transfers
have raised the income of the rural poor
by between 10% and 15%.
Quantifying the benefits derived from
the investment component of CTE
programs is not easy. In our study, we
estimate that the extra education
received by the poor would add about
8% to their lifelong earnings in Mexico
and 9% in Nicaragua. Since this increase
applies over the entire working life of the
cohort, its value is worth significantly
more than the monetary transfers poor
households receive. This improvement in
future earnings is permanent and does
not depend on continued safety net
spending. One could conclude that CTE
programs are at least twice as effective as
a straight transfer given the (permanent)
benefit to poor households from their
children’s increased future earnings.
The positive performance of CTE
programs does not mean they should be
established in countries that do not have
them, or expanded in those where they
already exist. Successful as they may be,
these programs are not a cure-all for
poverty or for correcting a country’s
educational shortfalls. While CTE
programs seem preferable to straight
transfers for addressing structural
poverty, they are no substitute for
implementing more comprehensive
safety nets that shield the poor from
temporary macroeconomic shocks,
natural disasters, and other emergencies.
Similarly, CTE programs will not improve
education outcomes in countries where
low levels of schooling among the poor
are not simply a demand-side problem.
In fact, putting excessive funding into a
CTE program would be a mistake if
enough schools, classrooms, and
teachers do not exist to give a quality
education to those who want or need it.
For CTE programs to remain effective,
countries have to face squarely the issue
of monitoring. At the school level, a
country’s education system requires
mechanisms to verify that children
enrolled in the program are actually
attending school, being promoted, and
receiving a quality education. A more
difficult problem is to ensure that
families are migrated from the program
when their income exceeds the threshold
for participation. Children also will have
to be disqualified from the program if
they drop out of school or are no longer
eligible after a certain grade. It seems
clear that if a program is to be
sustainable and well targeted in the long
run, it will need to include some kind of
periodic means test as a condition for
continued eligibility to ensure that
younger and new students are not
blocked from participating.
CTE programs are likely to have larger
poverty and educational impacts in the
countries of Sub-Saharan Africa and
South Asia than in Latin America. Primary
school enrollments are much lower in the
first two regions, and the impact of a CTE
program on the future earnings of poor
families is likely to be greater than it has
been in Latin American countries that
already have implemented them.
It is in the middle-income countries that
there may be trade-offs between
improving education and reducing
poverty. Countries like Mexico or Brazil,
where significant poverty coexists with
quite high enrollment rates, may
confront obstacles in targeting CTE
programs. The more inclusive the
program, the greater its impact on
poverty will be but with less positive
effects on raising enrollments.
Policymakers will have to confront this
conundrum by defining eligibility rules
that maximize the investment impact of
CTE programs while providing a safety
net for needy households.
Samuel Morley and David Coady, From
Social Assistance to Social Development:
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With regard to almost every socio-economic indicator, Latin America is
unambiguously the most unequal region in the world. Even the widespread economic
reforms of the 1990s have failed to bridge the chronic gaps between the region’s
richest and poorest citizens.
Such are the conclusions of a recent World Bank report based on data from 52
household surveys covering 3.6 million people in 20 Latin American and Caribbean
countries. The report, published last October, seeks to shed light on the region’s “excess
inequality,” which it blames for impairing efforts to reduce poverty, slowing down
economic growth, and undermining the development process itself.
Why is inequality so important? For a given level of mean income, less equal countries
will exhibit higher poverty levels than do more egalitarian nations. High-inequality
countries may also have greater difficulty in converting economic growth into welfare
improvements, or otherwise need to grow faster than more equal countries to achieve
the same reduction in poverty. Apart from weakening the poverty-reducing impact of
growth, high inequality in a global economy — in which people’s skills and knowledge
are critical to competitiveness — can actually slow down the pace of growth itself. The
combination of these two effects may imply that highly unequal countries find it
difficult or even impossible to escape absolute poverty.
Disparities between Latin America’s rich and poor historically have been high — and
remain so. In Guatemala, the income share of the top 10% of the population was 58.6
times that of the lowest 10% in 2000. In Brazil, children born to households from the
bottom 20% of the population are three times as likely to die before age five as
children from the richest. This figure is more than four times as high in Bolivia. The
average Mexican from the lowest quintile has only 3.5 years of schooling as compared
to 11.6 years for the average person from the top quintile. And in Peru, a medically
trained person attends nearly all deliveries of babies in the top quintile, but only 14%
of those in the bottom.
Latin America’s inequality also has been remarkably high when compared to other
regions. From the 1970s through the 1990s, the region’s Gini coefficient for per capita
income averaged 50.47 — nearly 10 points higher than in Asia and more than 20
greater than in Eastern Europe. The richest 10% of Latin Americans earn 30 times as
much as the poorest — a ratio that is almost three times higher than in industrialized
countries. Data on household expenditures tell a similar story. The region’s Gini is far
above that of Asia and Eastern Europe, and even slightly higher than in Africa.
Such large income gaps have translated into vastly dissimilar access to goods and
services. In spite of improvements during the last decade, basic services remain
unequally distributed in all countries. Large health disparities are also present, even
though average statistics on health status compare favorably to other regions.
Equally worrisome has been the rise in income inequality in the 1990s, with only two
countries (Brazil and Panama) witnessing a significant increase in the income share of
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been among the region’s more equal — as in Argentina, where the Gini climbed 7.7
points and poverty increased threefold between 1992 and 2001.
Not all was bad news, however. Gender differentials in income and education
narrowed during the 1990s from the previous decade. The education gap between
men and women even reversed for the younger cohorts, so that girls actually
overtook boys in educational attainment. Public social spending rose, not only in
per capita terms but also as a share of total spending and GDP. As a result, there
have been marked improvements in access to many public services and in key non-
monetary indicators of well-being such as life expectancy at birth, child mortality,
and literacy rates. There also has been a substantial increase in enrollment rates
and in mean years of schooling in all countries.
Yet despite a sizable rise in years of education among children from poor households,
the schooling gap between the wealthy and the poor has widened in far too many
countries. This gap is more pronounced among children and young adults,
suggesting a trend towards growing educational inequality in Latin America. The lack
of educational mobility is serious if one considers that the wage premium for skilled
workers rose in most countries during the 1990s.
In trying to explain Latin America’s high and persistent inequality, the report finds that
the region has been notably resilient to a range of policy experiments. It has “witnessed
economic booms and crude recessions, inward growth models and export-led growth
strategies, widespread public sector interventions and extensive pro-market reforms,”
yet none of these changes has managed to make income distribution significantly
more similar to other regions.
In fact, the causes of Latin America’s “excess inequality” are complex and deep-seated.
They are ingrained in the region’s history, culture, governance institutions, and social
fabric. Race and ethnicity are singled out as enduring determinants of one’s
opportunities. Even after controlling for educational attainment and jobs, people of
indigenous and African descent earn considerably less than whites for comparable
work, while non-white females are at the bottom of all asset-distribution scales across
the region.
It is the recognition of the interplay between the economic, political, and socio-cultural
sources of inequality that distinguishes this from other World Bank reports. Concepts
seldom addressed by the Bank find their place here: questions of social justice,
low-density citizenship, state capture by the elites, and inequalities of agency, voice
and power.
The report may also signal a shift in the Bank’s development discourse, and a return to
a preoccupation with redistribution not seen since the 1970s. Countries willing to
quicken the pace of poverty reduction should give serious consideration to
redistributing income and assets to the poor. A permanent redistribution of income to
the poor will not only make aggregate economic growth a more effective instrument
for reducing poverty, but may directly contribute to output expansion itself.
This, however, will require broad coalitions that bring together the poor, the middle
classes, and enlightened elites behind policies and programs seeking to ensure
equality of opportunities for all. Targeted programs for the poor, concludes the World
Bank, may need to be packaged together with universal access programs that also
benefit the middle classes.
World Bank, Inequality in Latin America and
the Caribbean: Breaking with History?,
2003.
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